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A Capacitive Voltage Transformer (CVT) is used in power distribution and transmission networks to 
transform the system operating high voltage to a low voltage signal which is an accurate representation 
of this operating voltage. This transformed voltage is used by protection and metering equipment.  
After an explosive catastrophic failure of a 145kV CVT in 2013, multiple forms of CVT health 
monitoring systems have been implemented throughout the Ergon Energy network. Recently a common 
form of online health monitoring has been discontinued, this along with a drive in Safety In Design 
(SID) has pushed a review into what is adequate CVT monitoring. 
This project investigates the common failure modes of CVTs while also analysing previous failures 
withinn the Ergon Energy network. The forms of monitoring the health and detecting these CVT failure 
modes have been investigated and detailed. The most common and most catastrophic failure mode and 
the subsequent monitoring methods became the major focus of this project. 
An assessment and testing of each monitoring method was carried out where the results gave a 
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1 Introduction 
Capacitive Voltage Transformers (CVT) are used in the power distribution and transmission industry 
as instrumentation transformers for accurate measuring of the system operating voltages. They take the 
operating, or primary, voltage and transform this a lower value, usually 110V/√3, to be used by 
protection and measurement devices safely.  
Failure of CVTs have become a common hazard in the power transmission and distribution industry. 
Reliability issues with these instrument transformers have had a detrimental effect on network 
performance and reliability. Explosive failures have had a large impact on the safety of personnel and 
the public and can also cause damage to neighbouring substation yard equipment. Extended outages for 
emergency rectifications and network switching are costly and have an impact on the public perception 
of Ergon Energy through high numbers of customer outages and decreased network reliability.  
CVT monitoring is common place within the power transmission and distribution networks. There are 
many forms of monitoring with significant differences in degradation detection methods and accuracy. 
A recent push in Safety In Design (SID) has made the issue of capacitive voltage transformer monitoring 




Morgan Viero student ID  
 
2 Aim 
This research project intends to carry out a failure mode and affect analysis on a list of common CVTs 
in operation within the Ergon Energy power distribution network. Detailed comparisons of each form 
of capacitive voltage transformer monitoring systems will be carried out. The monitoring systems will 
be assessed against their ability in identifying failing units and their cost benefit to the power 
distribution provider. An internal Ergon Energy report will be delivered detailing the recommended 
actions to be taken in CVT monitoring and a strategy for the management of the failing units. This will 
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3 Scope 
The scope of this project is primarily focused on gaining an effective operational result for the Ergon 
Energy network asset management group. The highest consequence and most likely cause of failure of 
a CVT is a failure of one or more capacitive elements within the capacitive stack. This project will focus 
on the effects on the secondary, or transformed, signal from a CVT which are subject to this mode of 
failure. A model will be developed to simulate multiple types of failure and to generate the resultant 
secondary signal to be used in laboratory testing. CVT monitoring systems in use within the Ergon 
Energy network will then be assessed on their ability to identify these failures and their associated costs 
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4 Background 
Instrumentation transformers are an integral part of power distribution and transmission networks. Their 
function is to take large primary voltages and currents and accurately transform them to lower values 
which can be used by measurement and protection devices safely. There are two main types of 
instrument transformers each providing differing functions. The Current Transformer (CT) provides an 
accurate representation of the primary current at a safe measurable value and the Voltage Transformer 
(VT) accurately transforms the primary voltage into a safely measurable value indicative of the network 
operating voltage.  
Voltage transformers are divided into two main types or construction groups, being inductive and 
capacitive. An Inductive Voltage Transformer (IVT) is constructed in a similar fashion to a power 
transformer. It usually has a steel core in which the primary and secondary windings are wound around. 
Typical IVT construction can be seen in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Typical IVT Construction (Crompton Greaves Limited, 2016) 
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A Capacitive Voltage Transformer (CVT) is constructed using a combination of two main parts, the 
Capacitive Voltage Divider (CVD) and the Electromagnetic Unit (EMU). Due to the construction 
methods and costs, capacitive voltage transformers are historically much more common throughout the 
power distribution and transmission industry particularly at voltages 66kV and above. CVTs can be 
used for protection, revenue metering and can allow for end to end communications between substations 




Ergon Energy has had CVTs in operation for decades and has seen multiple cases of catastrophic failure 
due to the breakdown and subsequent cascade failure of the capacitive elements within the CVT 
capacitive stacks. These types of failures have also been noted throughout the power industry which 
has prompted a move to have dedicated CVT health monitoring devices employed throughout 
distribution and transmission networks.  
Figure 2 - Typical CVT Construction (Crompton Greaves Limited, 2016) 
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Failure of a CVT within a substation can have the following impacts: 
• Network outages 
• Decreased flexibility in the network  
• Risk to the safety of personnel and the public 
• Risk of damage to other plant operating within the substation yard 
• Major damage to the reputation of the distribution network provider or transmission 
network provider who owns and/or operates the equipment 
• Possible risks to the reliability and security of the network 
• Possible inaccuracies in revenue metering. 
 
There are many methods of monitoring the health of a CVT, currently the Ergon Energy network 
employ the following methods, which will be detailed further below: 
• Oil sampling 
• Overvoltage / Undervoltage protection 
• SCADA based voltage differential 
• Dedicated CVT monitoring relays 
• Multifunction protection relays. 
Oil sampling is the most common form of health monitoring and is used throughout industry across 
many different types of oil insulated plant. A CVT uses oil and oil impregnated paper as the primary 
insulation medium. The capacitive stack is usually located within an independent hermetically sealed 
compartment, oil sampling is taken from the EMU tank and therefore provides no indication of the 
health of the capacitive elements. The other methods listed above are in operation throughout the Ergon 
Energy network at an ad hoc basis determined by the substation and feeder age, technology, importance 
and make of CVTs in operation. 
As part of the safety in design process, it has been identified that there is no clear direction to what is 
an appropriate form of CVT monitoring and what measures are needed to be taken for a CVT which is 
identified to be failing. Ergon Energy has identified this as a priority issue where a direction needs to 
be set. To do this the following information is desired: 
• How to identify the criticality of a failing CVT – the results of this knowledge can be used 
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• What form of CVT monitoring is required for a selected Substation – the results of this 
knowledge will be used to drive future projects. It is expected that this will detail many 
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5 Literature Review 
5.1 Capacitive Voltage Transformer construction 
A typical CVT is constructed with two major components. The first is the Capacitive Voltage Divider 
(CVD), it is comprised of several capacitor elements stacked on top of each other connected in series 
with oil impregnated paper used as the insulating medium seen as object 2 in Figure 3. The CVD is 
used to take the primary system voltage applied to the HV terminal at the top of capacitor stack and 
drop it to an intermediate voltage typically 22kV. This intermediate voltage is applied to second major 
component, the Electromagnetic Unit (EMU). The CVD consists of one or more hermetically sealed 
parts stacked on top of each other depending on the primary voltage rating. The capacitors allow for 
injection of high frequency signals into the power line conductor to provide communications between 
substation feeder distance protection relays, supervision / telemetry and voice communications, this is 
known as power line carrier signals (Hewitson, Brown, & Ramesh, 2004).  
The EMU consists of a step-down transformer and a compensation reactor. The compensating reactor 
provides an inductive reactance which is used to compensate for the capacitive reactance from the CVD 
giving a true representation in the secondary signal of the primary operating voltage. As seen in the 
schematic diagram in Figure 4 below a CVT is a capacitive / inductive circuit which is subject to a 
resonate frequency which can be supplied by various network disturbances. If this circuit were to go 
into resonance, the iron core would saturate causing high heat and therefore possibly break down 
insulation. To avoid this, a damping circuit is connected in parallel with one of the secondary windings 
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The single line principle of a CVT is detailed in Figure 4 below: 
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5.2 Modes of failure 
The major modes of failure of a typical CVT are: 
• Failure of one or more High Voltage (HV) capacitor elements within the capacitive voltage 
divider identified in Figure 4 as C1. As the number of failing elements increases the voltage 
output from the CVD becomes higher and higher until it gets to a point in which the oil 
impregnated paper insulating medium cannot contain. This can then cause an explosive 
failure which can have a flow on effect of damaging nearby equipment. 
• Failure of one or more Low Voltage (LV) capacitor elements within the capacitive voltage 
divider identified in Figure 4 as C2. This causes a decrease in the secondary voltage and an 
increase in the voltage differential across the remaining capacitive elements resulting in a 
cascade failure of these elements which can also lead to an explosion. 
• Failure of the electromagnetic unit, which can have an effect on accuracy of the secondary 
waveform including; distortion, changes in phase angle and magnitude. 
• Failure of the ferroresonate damping system, this can also have an effect on the accuracy 
of the secondary waveform. 
• Failure of the filter circuits or spark gaps, this can cause overvoltage’s in the secondary 
wave form due to transients and harmonics not being filtered out. 
• Flashover of the bushing due to creepage caused by pollution on the bushing. 
• Failure of the expansion membrane or sealing of the CVT. This can allow contaminates 
into the insulating oil, usually water, which leads to equipment failure (Kaszetenny & 
Stevens, 2007). 
The failure of a CVT can have major consequences due to their location and operational use within a 
substation. Voltage transformers are usually installed on the substation busbar and therefore a failure 
would cause a loss of supply to that busbar and all feeders connected to it which in turn causes a supply 
outage to a very large number of customers. This central location within the substation yard puts the 
majority of other yard equipment within a debris radius if a CVT were to explosively fail damaging the 
equipment (Kaszetenny & Stevens, 2007). 
5.2.1 Symptoms of Failure 
The CVD can comprise of hundreds of capacitive elements connected in series. As one element shorts 
and fails the rest of the elements within the stack are then subject to a higher voltage differential across 
them. This higher voltage differential causes more stress on the remaining elements causing more 
failures. The degradation of the capacitive elements therefore begins steadily and failures become more 
rapid as each element fails until the voltage differential across the remaining elements reaches a critical 
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point where cascading occurs. This is a total failure of the CVD and can result in an explosive failure 
(Gonzalea, Gallastegi, Zatica, & Cormenzana, 2014).  
Breakdown and shorting of capacitor elements cause errors in the secondary voltage magnitude and 
phase angle. These two symptoms are primarily used in online CVT health monitoring devices and 
schemes. The resulted secondary signal will have differing errors depending on the location of the 
shorted elements. Failure of one or more elements within the HV stack will cause an increase in 
secondary voltage and failure of one or more elements within the LV stack will cause a decrease in the 
secondary voltage (Kaszetenny & Stevens, 2007).  
 
5.3 Forms of monitoring 
5.3.1 Over / under voltage protection relay 
Traditionally CVT monitoring has been carried out in three phase groups though over and under voltage 
protection relays. These relays are very basic in operation in that they monitor the secondary voltage 
and send a protection signal to trip the relevant circuit breaker if the voltage is outside a set of parameters 
(ABB, 2006). The under / over voltage protection relay can therefore identify a failure of a CVT by 
detecting a poor quality secondary waveform caused by a multitude of possible failures within the CVT. 
This form of monitoring is limited in that the voltage limits set are usually +/- 10% of the nominal 
operating voltage to avoid inadvertent tripping due to minor network fluctuations. This large window 
does not indicate an early failure of a CVT and therefore only alarms once the CVT has had a 
catastrophic failure which could result in explosion (Kaszetenny & Stevens, 2007). 
5.3.2 Voltage Transducer based SCADA Voltage Differential 
In older substations there is very limited communications links and intelligent electronic devices which 
may be employed for the use of CVT monitoring. Using voltage transducers to convert the secondary 
voltage from the CVT into a readable signal is a very cost effective way to perform CVT monitoring. 
The signal from the voltage transducer’s can be measured by a substation Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) 
and then an alarm can be sent through the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system 
to alert the operational controllers of a possible CVT failure. This alarm is sent if any of the following 
conditions are met. 
• phase unbalance, 
• over voltage; and, 
• under voltage. 
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This method is limited by the accuracy and sampling rate of the voltage transducers and its inability to 
measure the negative phase sequence voltage (Wilson, 2017). 
5.3.3 Dedicated CVT monitoring relay 
The majority of CVT monitoring throughout the Queensland power distribution network is performed 
by dedicated CVT monitoring relays. These protection relays take inputs from the CVTs from all three 
phases and accurately measure their signals along with inputs from the associated current transformers. 
The CVT monitor is able calculate and send an alarm or tripping signal to the relevant protection relay 
for the following conditions (NovaTech, 2010): 
• Over voltage 
• Under voltage 
• Voltage differential between phases 
• Negative sequence voltage magnitude. 
5.3.4 Oil sampling 
Periodic oil sampling and dissolved gas analysis is the most common form of health monitoring of the 
majority of yard equipment within a substation. The routine maintenance regime is carried out 
periodically which is determined by the criticality of the installation, age of the CVT and health of the 
CVT. The dissolved gas analysis determines the health of the CVT by measuring key indicating 
chemicals which can be created within the insulating oil through arcing or degradation of paper 
insulation. The main identifiers of a failing CVT are high moisture and the presence of acetylene. 
As can be seen in Table 1 it is expected that the insulating oil may contain a low amount of water, when 
the level of water increases past the 20 parts per million ranges the unit should be taken from service. 
High moisture content within the oil sample indicates that either the sealing of the unit is no longer 
sufficient and water is entering or that the paper insulation within the unit is beginning to degrade and 
breakdown. These impurities cause the oil insulating properties to decline and the breakdown voltage 
to decrease thus heightening the risk of internal arcing and explosion. 
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Table 1- Application of Oil Testing 
 
In a dissolved gas analysis, the presence of acetylene indicates a partial discharge has occurred within 
the transformer. The immediate action is to remove the transformer from service before there is an 
explosive failure (IEC, 2013). 
Routine oil sampling keeps a good health record where the operator can make comparisons between 
units which are of the same make, model or age. This gives the operator knowledge on the high risk 
CVTs within the fleet which helps in planning for replacement projects. The main issue with oil 
sampling is that it usually requires the CVT to be de-energised which could possibly mean an outage 
for customers depending on the network configuration. It is also high cost consisting of; labour hours 
to conduct switching to make the routine maintenance safe and also the costs of the oil analysis in the 
laboratory (Kaszetenny & Stevens, 2007). 
5.3.5 CVT monitoring within protection relays 
CVT monitoring has not been a common function within a protection relay in the past. The new series 
of protection relays have modules capable of doing this function. The protection relay basically carries 
out all the functions of a dedicated CVT monitoring relay within the one package. This is seen as more 
cost effective as there is one less item of equipment to purchase, install and maintain while leave more 
space within protection panels (GE Industrial Systems, 2006). 
5.4 Industry Typical Alarm Setting 
The introduction of microprocessor-based protection relays has given a CVT monitoring function to the 
existing relays at no additional cost. Line protection relays commonly perform a distance protection or 
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line current differential protection function and commonly require a three-phase voltage input. 
Therefore, the additional CVT monitoring function can be carried out without the need for additional 
wiring or materials. Typically, the operating voltage of a distribution system may fluctuate plus or minus 
ten percent, if using overvoltage, undervoltage or voltage unbalance as the form of CVT monitoring 
this may cause the system to spuriously alarm. To ensure that this does not occur there is a time period 
which is set along with the sensitivity pickup protection setting.  
The National Electricity Rules (NER) states that the average voltage unbalance over a ten minute period, 
measured at a connection point, should not vary more than 1% of the system nominal supply voltage 
for systems operating above 100kV and 2% for systems operating at 10kV to 100kV (Australian Energy 
Market Commission, 2018). This is therefore a basis of the majority of time period setting for CVT 
alarms to be over 10 minutes. The set points are also derived from these rules by using negative 
sequence voltage pickup values of over 1% for system operating voltages of over 100kV and more than 
2% for system operating voltages of between 10kV and 100kV should prevent false alarming of CVT 
monitoring equipment. 






(𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 + 𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶) 
1 
 
Where:  V2 = Negative sequence voltage 
VA = A-phase voltage 
VB = B-phase voltage 
VC = C-phase voltage 
a = “a” operator or angular shift with respect to A-phase.  
Using per unit values, equation 1 is able to be rearranged to determine the expected secondary voltage 
(Va) signal subject to the negative sequence voltage pickup setting (V2) within a protection scheme 
detailed in equation 2 (Kaszetenny & Stevens, 2007). 
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Which can be simplified to equation 3 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎 = 3𝑉𝑉2 + 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 
3 
 
Analysing equation 3 shows that given balanced primary voltages of a system and assuming a degraded 
A-phase, the expected absolute magnitude of the A-phase secondary voltage (Va) is bounded by a circle 
with a radius of three times the negative sequence voltage pickup setting about the expected healthy 
secondary signal. This means that by using only negative sequence overvoltage protection and assuming 
no phase shift, an alarm would only be generated if the negative sequence voltage magnitude is greater 
than three times the pickup setting. This can be seen in Figure 5 where no alarm will be generated for 
all A-phase secondary voltage magnitudes which fall within the 3V2 red circular area. 
 
 
This method also provides coverage for the possible instance where the A-phase secondary voltage may 
not change in absolute magnitude and only a phase shift occurs. Equation 4 determines the angular shift 
required to generate a CVT alarm subject to the negative sequence voltage pickup setting (V2). 
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Modern relays providing a CVT monitoring function utilise both the negative sequence voltage 
magnitude pickup setting and voltage differential pickup setting. Phase voltage differential is measured 
from the absolute values of each phase and if a differential greater than the voltage differential pickup 
setting generates an alarm. The result of these protection elements combined with appropriate delays is 
better explained in the logic diagram in Figure 6 (Kaszetenny & Stevens, 2007). 
 
 
Where:  V2 = Negative sequence voltage 
D1 = Negative sequence voltage magnitude pickup setting 
D2 = Voltage differential pickup setting. 
These elements combined form a serviceable operating region shown in the hatched area in Figure 7. 
Figure 6 - CVT monitoring logic 
 
18 




Figure 7 - Serviceable operating region 
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6 Analysis of Previous Failures 
The following section details previous failures and incidents involving CVTs in operation caused by 
electrical breakdown of capacitive elements in the CVD C1 and C2 stacks. The secondary signal errors 
generated by these CVTs will be used to validate the simulation model created in section 9.6. 
 
6.1 Failure 1 - CVT Step change causing Network Access Restriction  
In April of 2019 a CVT monitoring alarm was generated by an Alstom M571 CVT monitoring relay 
indicating a voltage unbalance of the 132kV B phase CVT at the Ergon Energy Isis substation. On 
investigation it was found that an upward step change in the CVT secondary signal had occurred at the 
beginning of November 2018. The upward indication change of approximately 500 V can be seen in 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 - CVT Upward step change 
 
This unit was in operation after the step change for six months before the CVT monitoring system began 
generating sporadic alarms which would not reaper for multiple weeks. 
 
6.2 Failure 2 - CVT Voltage Unbalance Investigation 
In August of 2015 an alarm was generated due to a voltage unbalance of greater than 2.3% on the 
B phase of 66kV Belgium Gardens Feeder H197 at the Ergon Energy 66kV to 11kV Garbutt Substation. 
On site investigation found that B phase was producing a secondary signal 2.8% lower than those of 
the other two phase CVTs and the adjoining busbar voltage transformers. Figure 9 details the downward 
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Figure 9 - 66kV H197 Belgium Gardens Feeder Voltage Indications 
 
Once the unit was investigated onsite a Network Access Restriction (NAR) was placed on the feeder 
bay until the CVT could be removed from service. As this was a downward voltage step change and the 
indications stabilised at this value, the CVT remained energised and in service during this period of 
time.  
Once removed from the service the CVT was taken to the Ergon Energy workshop for investigation. 
Each capacitive element within the CVD was tested and it was found that one element in the C2 (lower) 
stack had failed. This failure is consistent with the downward voltage step change captured in Figure 9. 










The small faulted areas can be seen along the edges of the tin tabs which are used to fold back and 
connect to the next capacitive element in the stack. These faulted areas provided a short across the 
Figure 10 - Removal of the CVT bushing exposing the 
C2 capacitive stack 
Figure 11 - Failed capacitive element 
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element and lowered the capacitive reactance across the C2 stack which in turn lowers the output value 
of the CVD. 
 
6.3 Failure 3 - CVT Explosive Failure  
In February 2013 a 132kV Crompton Greaves CVE-145 CVT located at the Ergon Energy Cairns North 
132kV to 22kV bulk supply substation had a failure within the capacitive voltage divider resulting in 
an explosion. This explosion caused major damage to adjacent equipment within the substation.  
The failed CVT was central to the outdoor equipment and can be seen clouded in Figure 12 as B phase 
of the Woree 132kV feeder 7332 line VT -T07. 
 
Figure 12 - Cairns North Substation 7332 Feeder 
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The central location of the failed CVT on B phase was a contributing cause to major damage to 
neighbouring equipment including: 
• B phase CVT 
• B phase current transformer 
• B phase Surge Arrester 
• B phase Cable Termination and Standoff Insulators 
• HV conductor 
• Earth Tails 
• B phase Transformer Bushing seals and lug 
• B phase Transformer Wall Standoff Insulators. 
This model of CVT does not have any form of explosion venting system which may have decreased the 
damage to neighbouring equipment during this incident. This substantial collateral damage contributed 
to a total restoration cost of $178,942.92. 
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This event was caused by partial discharge tracking inside of the CVT bushing resulting in shorting out 
of capacitive elements within the capacitive voltage divider (CVD). The remaining elements were then 
subject to a higher electrical stress which eventually had a cascading failure effect across the CVD. This 
breakdown caused internal arcing within the CVD and EMU ending with an explosion destroying the 
CVD, bushing and EMU. The debris left from the exploded CVT is seen in Figure 14 and Figure 15. 
 
Figure 14 - Capacitive Voltage Divider and Bushing Debris 
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Figure 15 - EMU Damage 
 
It is believed that the initial conditions causing partial discharge tracking were due to a power 
transformer tap change which occurred previous to the event. However, no system disturbances were 
recorded prior. Figure 16 details the SCADA record of the event which shows the secondary output of 
the failed CVT rising gently 30 minutes prior to the explosion this was not identified at the time as 
overvoltage protection was only taken from the A phase CVT. 
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Figure 16 - 132kV 7332 Woree Feeder Voltage Indications 
 
The rise in the secondary voltage signal of the B phase CVT shown in Figure 16 indicates a failure and 
shorting of capacitive elements within the C1 capacitive stack this created a voltage stress across the 
remaining elements and initiated further failures. This process has continued until the voltage level 
inside the EMU tank exceeded the insulation limits and produced arcing within the tank. The heat and 
pressure produced from the internal arcing caused an explosion within the EMU tank driving the CVD 
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Figure 17 - EMU Tank Damage and Arcing 
 
Due to this event CVT online monitoring was introduced into the Ergon Energy network. As an interim 
measure CVT monitoring through voltage unbalance calculation by SCADA was developed and is still 
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7 Ergon Energy CVT Monitoring Methods 
7.1 Original Line Protection Relay 
7.1.1 Overview 
Before the introduction of CVT monitoring to the Ergon Energy network the main line protection relays 
in operation were the SEL-311L manufactured by Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories and the Micom 
P543. 
7.1.2 Setting and Operation 
Both relays perform the primary function of line current differential or distance protection and perform 
many other non-protection related functions.  
7.1.3 Limitations 
These relays were unable to provide a CVT monitoring function as they did not have the number of 
calculations elements within the unit to perform this additional function along with the line protection 
function. 
 
7.2 Alstom M571 and M871 
7.2.1 Overview 
Dedicated CVT monitoring was first introduced at Ergon Energy through the implementation of the 
Alstom M571 intelligent electronic device. This device was originally chosen due to its high accuracy 
and previous successful service to other power transmission and distribution providers as their CVT 
monitoring device. The M571 has since been superseded by a later model which Ergon Energy has 
implemented the same functions. The device measures voltage and current signals at a rate of 128 
samples per cycle, accommodating fundamental frequencies of 15Hz to 75Hz.  
7.2.2 Setting and Operation 
Online CVT monitoring protection settings are set at thresholds to ensure that spurious alarms are not 
generated during normal network operation. To ensure that the M571 monitoring relay will not create 
a false alarm the desired setpoints are set at 2.3% for CVTs operating at a primary voltage of less than 
100kV and 1.3% for CVTs operating at a primary voltage greater than 100kV. This becomes a total 
voltage difference of 1.46V and 0.86V for the lower and higher voltage classes respectively. Time 
delays are also introduced to cancel out the possibility of false alarms due to network transients. The 
Figure 18 below shows the protection logic diagram for a M571 CVT monitoring relay (Wilson, 2017). 
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Figure 18 - M571 CVT Monitoring Logic 
 
Under normal operation with balanced CVT secondary signals there is only one input signal into Virtual 
Output 3 sent from Virtual Output 1 which is indicating that the feeder bus is energised and CVT 
monitoring logic in enabled. As there is no failing CVT and all the secondary signals are balanced there 
is no output from Virtual Output 2 resulting in no alarm generated by Virtual Output 3. 
When a CVT failure is detected either through exceedance of voltage differential or exceedance of the 
negative sequence voltage setting, Virtual Output 2 generates an output signal. This signal is then 
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subject to a delay of 120ms to ensure that the fault is not spurious then this allows the alarm to be sent 
via Virtual Output 3. This time delay is essential to ensure that the CVT monitoring sensitivity allows 
for quick and accurate failure identification without providing false alarms (Wilson, 2017). The healthy 
operation of the CVT monitoring relay is supervised by the inbuilt watchdog and alarms from Output 
1. The physical connections of the Alstom M571 can be seen in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19 - M571 Signal Connections 
 
7.2.3 Limitations 
It has recently been identified that the M571 and M871 will no longer be produced and supported by 
Alstom. Obviously, this creates a large hole in CVT monitoring methods within the Ergon Energy 
network, particularly for brown field applications. At a cost of approximately $8000 dollars these relays 
are a much more expensive monitoring system than the SCADA based voltage differential system 
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7.3 High Accuracy Transducers Integrated with SCADA 
7.3.1 Overview 
Given that Ergon Energy has only been carrying out CVT online health monitoring since 2012 there 
are many aged substations which are operating with protection and communication technology which 
can be well over 40 years old. Existing sites which have CVTs in operation which have the Crompton 
Greaves models of CVT have been identified as high risk and therefore must have some form of CVT 
monitoring in operation. To replace existing protection equipment and schemes at many of these aged 
existing sites would mean major rectification works costing the business significant amounts of money 
and tying up valuable resources. To solve this issue SCADA based CVT monitoring was introduced. 
This protection scheme is able to utilise an existing analogue card within a substation Remote Terminal 
Unit (RTU), connecting a high accuracy voltage transducer, seen in Figure 20 below, and writing a code 
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7.3.2 Setting and Operation 
7.3.2.1 Hardware 
Physical connection of the system can be seen in Figure 21 below, where clouded is the voltage 
transducer and the single phase CVTs that are being monitored, -U17 and =DA-T07 respectively. The 
measuring device required is the three phase high accuracy voltage transducer. This unit takes the 
secondary signal from each single phase voltage transformer and converts it into a current which is 
representative of this voltage.  
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This equation would then be repeated comparing B and C phases then C and A phases. A typical 
SCADA calculation is shown in Figure 23 below where an alarm is generated if the voltage unbalance 
is over 2%. 
 
 
Figure 23 - Typical SCADA CVT monitoring code 
  
This form of voltage unbalance is a reasonable approach to identify network voltage unbalance 






� × 100 
6 
Where:  A = Voltage unbalance percentage for A phase 
VA = A-phase voltage 
VB = B-phase voltage 
VC = C-phase voltage 
This equation would then be performed for each phase to determine the phase unbalance with respect 
to the other two phases. This is a true representation of an unbalanced condition which may be caused 
by a failing CVT. 
If it is identified that one of these SCADA calculated percentages exceeds the 2% or 5% setting limit 
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7.3.3 Limitations 
The main limitation of this method of CVT monitoring is that it is currently only providing a voltage 
unbalance CVT monitoring function. The ability of this method to provide CVT monitoring through 
negative sequence voltage magnitude is not truly effective as there is no ability to measure the phase 
shift caused by a failing CVT. If, as discussed in section 5.4, the failing CVT causes a change in phase 
angle but no change in voltage magnitude an alarm will not be generated by this CVT monitoring 
scheme. 
 
7.4 GE L90 and D60 relays 
7.4.1 Overview 
In the latest Ergon Energy period contract for protection relays a line differential protection relay has 
been utilised for the role of CVT monitoring. The General Electric L90 and D60 protection relays have 
the ability to perform CVT monitoring on up to 4 CVTs at once using both voltage differential and 
negative sequence voltage measurement. This is an extremely high accuracy unit with voltage 
supervision pickup of 0 to 3.0pu in steps of 0.001pu and level accuracy of 0.5% (GE Multilin, 2014). 
Since both relays are able to provide the same CVT monitoring functions and both have the same 
protection settings implemented only the L90 will be discussed in this section. 
7.4.2 Setting and Operation 
The L90 setting is detailed in the Ergon Energy Relay Configuration Standard for GE L90 Line 
Differential Protection. This standard defines how the relay is to be configured for operation it details 
that CVT monitoring is carried out through the use of 7 elements seen in Figure 24. Elements 1 to 3 
provide the same basic function, they provide the voltage differential or comparison measurement by 
taking each phase signal, A thru C, and comparing it to the two remaining phase signals at a nominal 
pickup setting of 0.010pu. Element 4 is used to detect an increase in negative sequence voltage 
magnitude also at a nominal pickup setting of 0.010pu. Pickup settings are site and application specific 
and can therefore vary. Element 6 performs a specific voltage differential measurement between a 
selected phase voltage of one of the 3 connected CVTs and a connected auxiliary CVT this alarms at 
the same nominal setting as the previous elements. Elements 5 and 7 perform a CVT alarm blocking 
function. When the system falls below 0.5pu this element is used to identify a CVT voltage no longer 
present condition and therefore block any CVT alarms which are generated. All alarms are sent through 
virtual outputs using SCADA over ethernet to notify the network operators of CVT failing or unsafe 
condition. The device is also fully compatible with the IEC 61850 communication protocol which is 
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considered to be implemented in the future for Ergon Energy substation automation. The physical 
connection of the 3 single phase CVTs and auxiliary CVT are detailed in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25 - L90 signal connections 
 
7.4.3 Limitations 
The ability of the GE L90 to perform CVT monitoring as in inbuilt function is seen as great benefit 
particularly at new sites or sites having major protection upgrades. It saves valuable control panel space 
and decreases the amount of panel wiring. The major limitation of this relay is the cost and complexity 
of implementation. This relay would never be installed to perform a specific CVT function particularly 
in a brown field site, other less expensive options utilising existing hardware like the SCADA voltage 




Morgan Viero student ID  
 
8 Testing and Commissioning Requirements 
When purchasing any major electrical plant it is a requirement for the supplier to prove their product 
fully conforms to a strict technical specification which details the acceptable plant attributes, accuracy, 
operating conditions and testing requirements. The Ergon Energy technical specification for the 
purchase of voltage instrument transformers details all such requirements, with the main reference to 
the Australian Standard AS 60044-5 and the International Standard IEC 61869. The testing 
requirements for a CVT are detailed within these standards and broken into: 
1. type tests - performed once on single CVT of a particular model to ensure safe and accurate 
operation at the rated operating conditions. 
2. routine tests - performed on every CVT once manufactured to provide proof of accuracy and 
safety before installation. 
Before and after installation, CVTs are subject to extensive testing prior to being put into operation. 
This is carried out by commissioning teams which test the safe operation of the units along with ensuring 
that the accuracy requirements are met. By conforming to these strict standards and specifications it 
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9 Project Methodology 
9.1 Stakeholder Identification 
Information and input from industry technical experts and instrument transformer manufacturers is 
identified as a key to the successful outcome of this project. There are also multiple business units 
within Ergon Energy which will be affected by the outcome of the resulting technical report. These 
stakeholders and stakeholder groups have been broken into internal and external groups to Ergon 
Energy and are listed below: 
Internal 
• Simon Hickey – Senior Substation Standards Engineer (project industry supervisor) 
• Rob Coggan – Manager Protection and Earthing System 
• Russell Wilson – Senior Protection Standards Paraprofessional 
• Asset Lifecycle Management Group 
• Network Operations Group 
• Substation Design Group 
External 
• Kartik Iyer – EPC International 
• Kevin Lee – GFF Power 
• Domenico Rotili – ABB Australia 
The stakeholder list was continually updated as the project progressed to ensure that all parties involved 
can provide sufficient review of the final dissertation results. 
 
9.2 Failure Mode Identification 
Common failure modes have been identified in detail by the works of Kasztenny and Stevens in section 
5 above. This project will focus in detail on failures of the capacitive elements within the capacitive 
stack as this type of failure has the most catastrophic consequence and is statistically the most common. 
These failures will be identified in terms of their location within the CVD High Voltage and Low 
Voltage stacks. It has been stated above that a failure of a capacitive element within each location will 
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9.3 Assessment Criteria 
Each form of monitoring was assessed based on the following criteria: 
• Accuracy of voltage differential measurement 
• Accuracy of phase shift measurement 
• Cost of implementation in green field (new) applications 
• Cost of implementation in brown field (existing) applications. 
Scoring of monitoring equipment accuracy was determined by the magnitude of error indicated as 
percentage of the input test signal. Protection settings and configuration of these devices are detailed 
and only the setting currently in use in the Ergon Energy Network was assessed. Scoring of the 
implementation costs was against 2 scenarios based on actual operating substations within the Ergon 
Energy network. This was one new or green field installation and one existing or brown field 
installations where existing equipment may be utilised or may need to be removed for the 
implementation. Costings have been sourced from completed projects to ensure all expenses are 
captured. 
9.4 CVT Manufacturer Information 
Information on the CVTs in operation in the Ergon Energy network was gathered from the relevant 
supplier rating plates and test reports examples of the rating plate data can be seen in Figure 26 and 
Figure 27. 
 
Figure 26 - CVE-72.5 Crompton Greaves Rating Plate 
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Other rating plates gathered are detailed in Appendix D. 
 
9.5 Simulation Model Development 
9.5.1 Introduction 
Two simulation models were developed within Mathcad to test voltage unbalance and negative 
sequence magnitude detection of each of the CVT monitoring methods. This was used to simulate the 
following conditions and predict the CVT secondary signals from different CVT makes and models: 
• Failure of a single and multiple capacitor elements in the HV stack 
• Failure of a single and multiple capacitor elements in the LV stack 
• Combinations of failures within each stack. 
9.5.2 Voltage Unbalance Simulation 
Detection of a failure of a capacitive element within the CVD is the primary goal of CVT monitoring. 
As described in section 5.2 a failure of an element within the CVD will have an effect on the magnitude 
of the CVT secondary signal depending on the location of the faulted element. Calculation of the output 
of the CVD is determined by equation 7 below using Figure 28 as reference. 
 
Figure 27 - VCU-72.5 Koncar Rating Plate 
 
43 
Morgan Viero student ID  
 
 
Figure 28 - CVT Schematic 
 





Where:  Vout = Voltage output from the CVD - A1 (V) 
Vprim = Phase Primary Voltage - A (V) 
C1 = Capacitance of C1 stack (pF) 
C2 = Capacitance of C2 stack (pF) 
Equation 7 is simply a voltage divider calculation which assumes a serviceable CVD. To determine the 
effect of a failed element on the output signal the capacitance of each element must be determined using 
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the relevant data from section 9.4. Since each element within each stack are connected in series the 
following starting equation is used:  
 
𝐶𝐶1 = (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸1−1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸2−1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸3−1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸4−1+. . )−1 
8 
Where:  C1 = Capacitance of C1 stack (pF) 
CE1 = Capacitance of element 1 of the C1 stack (pF) 
CE2 = Capacitance of element 2 of the C1 stack (pF) 
CE3 = Capacitance of element 3 of the C1 stack (pF) 
CE4 = Capacitance of element 4 of the C1 stack (pF) 
 
The above equation continues through to the (n) total number of elements within the stack. Each element 
within each stack are manufactured to be identical therefore equation 8 is simplified to determine the 
capacitance of an individual element. 
 
𝐶𝐶1𝐸𝐸 = 𝐶𝐶1 × 𝑛𝑛 
9 
Where:  C1E = Capacitance of an individual C1 element (pF) 
C1 = Capacitance of the C1 stack (pF) 
n = Number of elements within the stack 
 
As both stacks are constructed in the same manner, equation 9 is used to determine both C1 and C2 
individual element capacitance. Using the equations above the voltage out of a CVD with a number of 
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+ 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸2𝑛𝑛2 − 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2
� 
10 
Where:  Vout = Voltage output from CVD - A1 (V) 
Vprim = Phase Primary Voltage - A (V) 
C1E = Capacitance of an individual C1 element (pF) 
C2E = Capacitance of an individual C2 element (pF) 
n1 = Number of elements within the C1 stack 
n2 = Number of elements within the C2 stack 
nf1 = Number of failed elements within the C1 stack 
nf2 = Number of failed elements within the C2 stack 
 
Equation 10 assumes at the active power loss changes within the capacitive stack are negligible with 
respect to the changes in reactive impedance. 
Using the calculation methods above the below model has been developed using Mathcad. As the 
voltage unbalance detection method is primarily focused of the failure of capacitive elements within the 
















9.5.3 Negative Sequence Magnitude Simulation 
It has been identified by the works of Kasztenny and Stevens that a capacitive voltage transformer that 
has failures of capacitive elements within each of the C1 and C1 stacks may not have a large enough 
effect on the secondary signal for voltage unbalance CVT monitoring to detect a failure. The use of 
negative phase sequence voltage magnitude and therefore phase angle shift is therefore monitored by 
typical dedicated CVT monitoring relays. This gives the system a serviceable operating region shown 








An ideal voltage transformer will have no losses and no phase angle difference between its primary 
signal and the measured secondary signal. The capacitive stacks and EMU are therefore tuned to have 
a total circuit reactive impedance of zero. To determine the effects of failures of capacitive elements, 
the inductive impedance of the EMU must be calculated. First the capacitive impedance of each stack 








Where:  Xc1 = Capacitive impedance of the C1 stack (Ω) 
C1 = Capacitance of the C1 stack (F) 
f = Frequency of the system (50 Hz) 
 
Using a simplified version of Figure 28, the circuit shown in Figure 30 - CVT simplified circuit is used 
to calculate the inductive impedance (XL) through equation 12 knowing the total reactive impedance of 
an ideal CVT is equal to zero. 
 
Figure 29 - Serviceable operating region 
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Where:  XL = Inductive impedance of equipment within the EMU (Ω) 
Xc1 = Capacitive impedance of the C1 stack (Ω)) 
Xc2 = Capacitive impedance of the C2 stack (Ω) 
 
By using the equations 8 and 9 in section 9.5.2 above the capacitance of the C1 or C2 stacks with a 







Where:  C1f = Capacitance of the C1 stack with failed elements (pF) 
C1E = Capacitance of an individual C2 element (pF) 
n1 = Number of elements within the C1 stack 
nf1 = Number of failed elements within the C1 stack 
 
The impedance of the C1 and C2 stacks with a number of failed elements are calculated by equation 
14. 
Figure 30 - CVT simplified circuit 
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Where:  Xc1f = Capacitive impedance of the C1 stack with failed elements (Ω) 
C1f = Capacitance of the C1 stack with failed elements (F) 
f = Frequency of the system (50 Hz) 
 
Results from equations 12, 13 and 14 can then be used to determine the total CVT reactive impedance 
when subject to a failure within the CVD. 
 






Where:  Xj = Total reactive impedance of the CVT subject to failure (Ω) 
Xc1f = Capacitive impedance of the C1 stack with failed elements (Ω) 
Xc2f = Capacitive impedance of the C2 stack with failed elements (Ω) 
XL = Inductive impedance of equipment within the EMU (Ω) 
 
The burden on the CVT secondary circuit is then used to determine the total circuit impedance. CVT 
rated burden is detailed in section 9.4 as 100VA this is the maximum burden the VT can have on the 
secondary circuit without affecting the transformation accuracy. A conservative burden of 25VA has 
been selected for this simulation as this covers the burden associated with modern protection relays, 
metering equipment and secondary cabling. Secondary burden is then converted to impedance and 















Where:  R = Secondary circuit active impedance referred to the primary side (Ω) 
Vprim = Primary voltage (V) 
Vsec = CVT secondary voltage (110V) 
Zj = Total reactive impedance of the CVT subject to failure (Ω) 
 
Total circuit impedance is shown in equation 17. 
 
𝑍𝑍 = 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 
 
17 
Where:  Z = Total circuit impedance referred to the primary side (Ω) 
R = Secondary circuit active impedance referred to the primary side (Ω) 
Xj = Total reactive impedance of the CVT subject to failure (Ω) 
 
The phase angle (a) due to the change in circuit reactive impedance is then calculated using equation 
18. 
 




The negative sequence voltage magnitude is then calculated by manipulating equation 4 as from the 
works of Kasztenny and Stevens below. 
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9.6 Simulation Model Validation 
The failure calculation sheet was developed within Mathcad which simulates the effects that failures of 
capacitive elements within the C1 and C2 stack will have on the secondary signals. This comprises of 
a voltage unbalance calculation, phase shift calculation and negative sequence voltage magnitude 
calculation. The failures previously analysed in section 0 have been used below in Table 4 to validate 
the calculations. 
Failure Number of C1 








Failure 1 C1 = 1 
C2 = 0 
132800 V C1 = 1 
C2 = 0 
133055 V  
Failure 2 C1 = 0 
C2 = 1 
66096 V C1 = 0 
C2 = 1 
66165 V  
Failure 3 Unknown Approx. 148000 V C1 = 14 
C2 = 0 
148484 V  
Table 4 - Failure Analysis to Simulation Comparison 
 
Table 4 shows that the voltage magnitude CVT failure simulation had an error of 0.2% for failure 1 and 
0.1% for failure 2. As failure 3 was an explosive failure there was no evidence of the number of 
capacitive elements failed and therefore cannot be used for validation. However, the gradual voltage 
rise seen in the SCADA plot in Figure 16 can be generated within the simulation as single capacitive 
elements within the C1 capacitive stack gradually fail. The successful results of failure 1 and 2 validates 
the simulation model. 
 
9.7 Test Signal Development 
Current protection settings in use for voltage unbalance are 2% and a suggested critical limit of 5% 
these have been determined by the criticality of the feeder in which the CVT is in operation and the 
network characteristics. Negative sequence magnitude is set at 2.3% which has been based on the 
national electricity regulation requirements. By gathering the construction data from each of the 
common CVT models currently in service in the Ergon Energy, the network model will be developed 
by using the methods presented by Kasztenny and Stevens and the EQ protection standards group to 
determine the simulated testing input signals. 
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Simulated test signals will be developed for each model of Crompton Greaves CVT and vary by the 
number of failed elements and location of them. Figure 31, Figure 32 and Figure 33 show the expected 
voltage magnitude and negative sequence voltage magnitude and subsequent phase angle change for a 
72.5kV CVT with various numbers of failed capacitive elements. Appendix E contains the plotted data 
for the 132kV and 145kV simulations. Within these plots are also the standard protection setting limits 
thus detailing the number of failed elements required within each stack to generate a CVT failure alarm. 
 
 
Figure 31 - CVE-72.5 Voltage Unbalance Simulation 
 
Figure 31 circled in red details the point at which the failing unit breaks through the voltage unbalance 
protection pickup setting and therefore should generate an alarm, details for each are below: 
1. Failure of a number of C1 elements breaking through the 2% voltage unbalance threshold 
2. Failure of a number of C1 elements breaking through the 5% voltage unbalance threshold 
3. Failure of a number of C2 elements breaking through the 2% voltage unbalance threshold 
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Figure 32 - CVE-72.5 Negative Sequence Voltage Simulation 
 
Figure 32 circled in red details the point at which the failing unit breaks through the negative sequence 
magnitude protection pickup settings and therefore should generate an alarm, details for each are below: 
1. Failure of a number of C2 elements breaking through the 2.3% negative sequence magnitude 
threshold 











7 0 69.58 0 
Voltage 
Unbalance 5% 
0 2 59.65 0 
Phase Shift 3.95 
deg / 0.023pu 
12 0 63.5 4.2 
Phase Shift 3.95 
deg / 0.023pu 
0 1 63.5 6.918 
Table 7 – CVE-145 Failure Signals 
 
9.8 Testing of CVT Monitoring Methods 
9.8.1  Protection Relay Laboratory Testing 
Testing was carried out on the GE D60 and Alstom M871 relays within the Ergon Energy protection 
laboratory under the supervision of a senior protection standards officer. A Doble F6150 power system 
simulator was used to inject three single phase signals into each relay seen in Figure 34. All three phases 
were monitored and recorded by a Yokogawa DL850 waveform recording instrument seen in Figure 
35. Figure 36 details the testing circuit connection for the Alstom M871 relay. The test circuit for the 
GE D60 relay has no significant differences to that of the M871.  
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Figure 35 - Yokogawa DL850 
 
 
Figure 36 - Protection Relay Test Circuit 
 
 
Figure 37 - GE D60 Front 
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Each of the relays were configured with a 2% and a 5% voltage unbalance pickup setting and a 2.3% 
negative sequence voltage magnitude setting. The pickup time period was shortened to 5 seconds to 
speed up the testing process. Two of the phases, B-phase and C-phase, were kept at the nominal healthy 
magnitude of 110/√3 with no phase shift. A-phase was used as the simulated CVT failure signal and 
was first varied in magnitude until the positive and negative 2% and 5% voltage unbalance CVT alarms 
were produced by each relay. Figure 40 and Figure 41 show the input voltages for the 2% positive and 
5% negative M871 generated alarms from the Doble F6150 control suite. 
 
 
Figure 38 - GE D60 Rear Connections 
Figure 39 - Alstom M871 Connections 
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Figure 40 - 2% A-Phase Voltage Unbalance 
 
 
Figure 41 - 5% A-Phase Voltage Unbalance 
Each relay was monitored though their configuration software while the A-phase volateg magnitude 
was varied unit the unbalance alarm was generated. Figure 42 details a CVT alarm pickup on Virtual 
Output 59 (VO 59) and voltage unbalance alarms between A-phase and B-phase at VO 61 and between 
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Figure 42 - GE D60 Virtual Output Status 
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Figure 43 - Yokogawa 2% Voltage Unbalance 
 
Testing was then repeated by restoring each phase to the correct magnitude and then varying the phase 
angle of A-Phase until the 2.3% negative sequence voltage magnitude CVT alarm was generated by 
each relay. The test signal generated is seen in Figure 44. The alarm is generated from VO 59 in Figure 
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Figure 44 – A-Phase 4.5 degree phase shift test signal 
 
 
Figure 45 - Negative Sequence Voltage Magnitude CVT Alarm 
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9.8.2  SCADA Programmed Voltage Differential 
Testing of the SCADA form of CVT monitoring was carried out within the Ergon Energy 
communication systems workshop under the supervision of a senior protection standards officer and 
SCADA design engineer. The Doble F6150 power system simulator was used to inject a single phase 




Figure 46 - Voltage Transducer Connection 
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The voltage transducer output was connected to an analogue input on the ADI card on the test rack 
Remote terminal unit shown in Figure 48. 
 
Figure 47 - Voltage Transducer input output 
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A SCADA simulated testing environment was created, seen in Figure 49, this page was monitored while 
the voltage magnitude input from the Doble varied until the 2% and 5% CVT voltage unbalance alarms 
were generated, see Figure 50 and Figure 51 
 
 
Figure 49 - SCADA Test Environment 
 
























3.95° 4.5° 4.5° 13.9% 
GE D60 Voltage 
unbalance 
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5% low 
60.3V 60.2V 5.21% 0.21% 
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9.9 Assessment of Monitoring Methods 
The traditional monitoring method of oil sampling will not be included within this assessment as this 
form of monitoring detects the health and subsequent age of the CVT insulation medium. Oil sampling 
is not used to detect a failure within the capacitive voltage divider and therefore would not make for a 
fair and adequate assessment. It is recommended that oil sampling continue on CVTs which are aged, 
have little operational life information and are models which have history of insulation breakdown. 
The three forms of CVT monitoring tested in section 9.8 have been assessed against each other to the 
criteria proposed in section 9.3. 
9.9.1  Accuracy of voltage differential measurement 
As can be seen in the testing carried out in section 9.8 and the technical data listed for each system in 
section 7 the GE D60 and L90 and Alstom M571 and M871 protection relays perform this function 
with great accuracy 0.2% maximum error.  The SCADA CVT monitoring method also performed very 
well with a maximum error of 0.37% however if more time were available, calibration of the voltage 
transducer could have been further refined to minimise this error. 
Assessment Result – Undistinguishable  
9.9.2  Accuracy of phase shift measurement 
It has been identified that errors have been made within some of the testing of phase shift measurement 
in section 9.9.2 this is attributed to the step changes in phase angle being too large. However as the 
SCADA form of monitoring cannot perform this function, the protection relays are clearly the forms of 
CVT monitoring to utilise. 
Assessment Result – GE D60, L90 and Alstom M571, M871  
9.9.3  Cost of implementation in green field (new) applications 
Assessment of the cost of implementation in a green field site greatly advantages the GE line protection 
relays as they perform multiple functions and are just dedicated to CVT monitoring. If an Alstom relay 
of SCADA voltage transducer were to be implemented there would still have to be an additional line 
protection relay installed thus adding to cost and labour hours. Purchase price for each method is listed 
below. 
• Alstom M871 - $4757.80 
• GE L90 - $8215.00 - $11855.00 dependant on the site line protection requirements 
• GE D60 - $7546 dependant on site line protection requirements 
• Paladin 3 phase Voltage Transducer - $384.52. 
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 Assessment Result – GE D60, L90  
9.9.4  Cost of implementation in brown field (existing) applications 
By making the assumption that the brownfield site has available Remote Terminal Unit analogue inputs 
the SCADA method of CVT monitoring is greatly advantaged. Installation of this method requires 
minimal design and construction labour hours and very low purchase cost. It should be noted that the 
SCADA from of CVT monitoring was originally produced solely for brown field applications. It should 
be captured within the Safety in Design risk assessment that the SCADA form of CVT monitoring 
doesn’t not have the capacity for phase shift detection. 
Assessment Result – SCADA Programmed Voltage Differential and Alstom M871 
9.9.5  Result 
In a greenfield application it is obvious that the CVT monitoring function should be performed by the 
line protection relays, GE 60 and GE L90. These protection relays are already going to be installed and 
therefore it would be redundant to add additional equipment and wiring.  
In brownfield applications it could be argued that the Alstom M871 provides further CVT failure 
detection through monitoring the phase shift. This project has found that for the CVTs modelled if there 
are failures of capacitive elements within only the C1 or C2 stacks that the voltage unbalance protection 
setting will alarm well before the negative sequence magnitude alarm will be generated. For capital 
price, design hours and installation hours the SCADA method is the recommended form of monitoring 
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10 Conclusions 
10.1 Recommendations and Further Work 
The main goal of Safety in Design is to eliminate any hazards through the design rather than provide 
control measures. In the future where it is intended that the SCADA from of CVT monitoring be 
installed it is recommended that a phase angle transducer be installed along with the voltage transducer. 
This can be seen in Figure 52. This will then provide both the negative sequence magnitude alarming 
and the voltage unbalance magnitude alarming. 
 
 
10.2 Project Achievement of Objectives 
Overall the project has been successful, and all the project’s objectives have been achieved. All common 
CVT failure modes and their subsequent monitoring method where identified and detailed with the main 
focus drawn to the most common and most catastrophic failure mode. This was a failure of the 
capacitive elements within the capacitive voltage divider and the online CVT monitoring methods used 
to detect these failures. This can be found in sections 5.2, 5.3 and 7. 
CVT monitoring assessment criteria were developed in section 9.3. These were used to form a 
recommendation for which CVT monitoring method should be used in brownfield (existing) and 
greenfield (new) applications. It was found that with the addition of a fully approved risk assessment 
on each site, the SCADA method of CVT monitoring should be installed for brown-field sites. Green-
field sites should continue with the installation of the new multifunction protection relays carrying out 
the CVT monitoring function. 
A simulation model was created using Mathcad software which provided the secondary signal which 
would be apparent when a CVT is subject to a failure of a number of capacitive elements within either 
Figure 52 - Phase Angle Transducer 
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part of the capacitive voltage divider. This model was validated in section 9.6 against the analysis of 
previous failures within the Ergon Energy network in section 6 where it was found to have a maximum 
error of 0.2%. Simulation model development and validation can be seen in sections 9.5 and 9.6. This 
model is intended for use in future protection setting to help identify single element failures at individual 
sites while limiting the number spurious alarms. 
As part of the CVT monitoring methods assessment, physical testing was carried out within the Ergon 
Energy protection laboratory and SCADA workshop. This gave a good background into system 
operation with particular knowledge gains in the SCADA method of CVT monitoring. This testing is 
documented in section 9.8. 
Lastly this project has helped in the development of an Ergon Energy recommendation document which 
details the CVT monitoring methods and setting to be implemented for a particular model of CVT 
installed at a greenfield or brownfield site. It is hoped that the knowledge gained, and simulation model 
developed in this project will be used in future technical specifications for the purchase of CVTs for the 
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Appendix A Project Specification 
ENG4111/4112 Research Project 
Project Specification 
For:    Morgan Viero 
 
Title:   Capacitive Voltage Transformer Monitoring and Failure Mode Analysis 
Major:   Power engineering 
Supervisors:   Dr. Andrew Hewitt 
 
Enrolment:   ENG4111 – ONC S1, 2019 
ENG4112 – ONC S2, 2019 
 
Project Aim:  To analyse the current Ergon Energy methods of Capacitive Voltage Transformer 
(CVT) monitoring and make detailed comparisons of their effectiveness in 
identifying each of the CVT modes of failure. 
 
Programme: Version 1, 18th March 2019 
 
1. Identify and categorise common CVT modes of failure by sourcing quality data 
and information from instrument transformer manufacturers and power 
transmission and distribution entities. 
 
2. Analyse and report in detail the common methods and modes of CVT health 
monitoring.  
 
3. Create assessment criteria for making comparison of CVT monitoring methods.  
 
4. Investigate and develop methods to simulate symptoms of each of the CVT 
failure modes. 
 
5. Carry out assessment of CVT monitoring methods and equipment. 
 
6. Provide a recommendation of which mode to be used in each application 
 
7. Develop a strategy paper on managing the Ergon Energy fleet of CVTs. 
 
If time and resources permit: 
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Appendix B Safety Issues 
Successful completion of this project will require both theoretical and practical assessment. It is 
expected that if all resources and technical expertise are available the practical assessment of the CVT 
monitoring devices should be completed over 2 to 3 half days totalling in 12 hours. All testing will be 
carried out within the Ergon Energy protection laboratory under the supervision of qualified staff. 
Testing procedures will align with the Ergon Energy safe work practices and will be detailed in a daily 
task risk management plan.  
Risk Evaluation 
As all testing will be carried out on Ergon Energy property by Energy Queensland personnel the Energy 
Queensland risk evaluation process must be adopted. This evaluation is seen as a live document and is 
expected to be added to and adjusted over the length of the project. 
Risk Evaluation Methodology 
The Energy Queensland Evaluation process consists of three major steps: 
1. Hazard Identification 
2. Consequence Classification, and 
3. Likelihood Classification. 
The consequence classification is broken into several areas, the risk evaluation for this project will focus 
only on consequences involving people. Once each hazard is classified appropriate control measure will 
be applied if appropriate. Once classified each hazard will be score using a 4 x 5 risk matrix detailed in 
the figure below. A score of tolerable after implementing control measures is the only outcome 
acceptable for the practical assessment to proceed. 
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